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Banks and insurance companies in Japan have been more inclined to hold stock directly and 
indirectly in clients that borrow more intensely from them, based on analysis of 1980 data. This 
evidence is consistent with the rationale for such stockholding being to resolve agency problems of 
debt. In carrying out this investigation a new measure of indirect shareholding is developed. 
SHAREHOLDING INTERLOCKS IN THE KEIRETSU, JAPAN'S FINANCIAL GROUPS 
I. Introduction 
Business groups have been an important feature of Japan's industrial 
organization at least since the beginning of this century. Even as early as 
the 1870's there had already emerged the Yasuda banking complex, Mitusbishi 
shipping congolomerate, and Mitsui trading company, all of which later became 
the cornerstones in the vast commercial empires known as the zaibatsu, 
precursors of the current-day keiretsu. But the period of greatest prominence 
of zaibatsu was not until the 1920' s. As the World War I economic boom 
subsided in Japan, many small manufacturing enterprises collapsed, leaving the 
field to the large firms which were predominately companies affiliated with one 
or another of the four major zaibatsu (Mitusi, Mitsubishi, Yasuda, and 
Sumitomo). These zaibatsu each consisted of disparate firms including banks, 
trading companies, and manufacturing concerns, much of whose stock reposed in a 
common holding company qua head-office, which was itself controlled by a 
wealthy family. In 1948 the Occupation authorities dissolved the zaibatsu 
shareholding interlocks and at about the same time the Antimonopoly Laws of 
Japan (1947, ammended in 1953) permanently abolished holding companies (Uekusa, 
1977). 
By the early 1960's many of the companies previously associated with each 
of the four major zaibatsu had reestablished shareholding ties with one 
another. Banks were and continue to be the major nexus of interlocking 
shareholding in these "financial keiretsu". Besides the progeny of the big 
four: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Fuyo (formerly Yasuda), the six major 
keiretsu include the Dai-Ichi Kangyo group consisting mainly of former members 
of the smaller Kawasaki and Furukawa zaibatsu and the Sanwa group which has no 
prewar antecedent. Other groupings of firms include the so-called enterprise 
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groups (kigyo shudan) each consisting of a major manufacturer--such as Toyota, 
Toshiba, or Mitsubishi Heavy Industries--and its family of subsidiaries, 
suppliers, subcontractors, wholesalers and so on. Toyo Keizai, Kigyo Keiretsu 
Soran. 1988, identifies 28 separate enterprise groups in all. The focal firms 
of the enterprise groups are often themselves members of one or another of the 
six major financial keiretsu. In this sense the major financial keiretsu are 
actually themselves "groups of groups", as Kobayashi, 1980, notes p. 66. 
My concern in this paper is the economic rationale for the six major 
financial keiretsu, focusing on the Presidents' Club member companies in fiscal 
year 1980. These Presidents' Clubs meet once a month and include 
representatives of the largest companies closely affiliated with each of the 
six keiretsu. These include in each of the six instances, a city bank, trust 
bank, and insurance companies, as well as a general trading company and major 
manufacturing companies in a spectrum of different industries. The total 
number of members in 1980 ranged from 21 (Sumitomo) to 45 (Dai-Ichi Kangyo). 
The city bank of each of the six is the principle lender, "main bank", to most 
of the nonfinancial members of the Presidents' Club with which it is 
affiliated. These Presidents' Clubs are not mutually exclusive. For instance 
in 1980 Hitachi was affiliated with the Presidents' Clubs of the Fuyo, Sanwa, 
and Dai-Ichi Kangyo groups. Kobe Steel, Denki Kagaku Kogyo, and Nissho Iwai 
were all affilated with both the Dai-Ichi Kangyo and Sanwa Presidents' Clubs. 
Other companies were affiliated with no more than one Presidents' Club. In 
1981 the members of the six Presidents' Clubs altogether owned about one fourth 
of all corporate asssets in Japan. 
The members of these respective Presidents' Clubs are linked by a web of 
interlocking shareholding, interlocking directorates, and ties of trade and 
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credit. Coughlan and Scheer (1987) have demonstrated that the interlocking 
directorates are well explained by the shareholding ties. Thus the pattern of 
interlocking directorates affords little information regarding the ties between 
the companies that is not implicit in the shareholding links. Financial 
institutions, including city banks, trust banks and insurance companies, are 
prohibited by the Antimonopoly Laws of Japan from holding more than a set 
percentage of the outstanding stock of any other company. This limit was set 
at 5% in 1948 but was raised to 10% in the 1953 amendments to the Antimonopoly 
Law. In 1981 the limit was again changed for banks, to 7%, and has since been 
changed yet again to 5% (For life insurance companies it is still 10%). Today 
the six major city banks in many instances hold stock interests in fellow 
members of the respective Presidents' Clubs near the legal limit. In 1980 the 
10% limit was attained in only a handful of instances for these firms. 
The fraction of all members' outstanding shares held within the respective 
Presidents' Club groups ranged from 14% for Dai-Ichi Kangyo to 26% for Sumitomo 
in 1980. The shareholding ties between any two firms in a same Presidents' 
Club are typically in the range of 1% to 5%, not nearly sufficient to confer 
any real control of the voting stock. Shareholding ties across group lines are 
of a much smaller magnitude typically. 
Presidents' Club members borrow principally but not exlusively from fellow 
members. As already mentioned the single largest lender to a company is 
usually the city bank that belongs to the same Presidents' Club as the company 
itself. The usual pattern in 1980 was that the clubs' City bank accounts for 
10% Lo 20% of a nonfinancial member's total borrowing, the trust bank 5% to 
10%, and a life insurance company 1% to 5%. The balance of a typical 
company's total borrowing was from outside the group including borrowing from 
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financial members of other Presidents' Clubs than the one of affiliation. 
Presidents' Club members also borrow from the three long-term credit banks 
which are not affiliated with any group, the seven of the thirteen city banks 
not affiliated with the six major keiretsu, and from the more than fifty 
regional banks. Public bond offerings were quite rare until the last few 
years. The reason is that regulation of interest rates and par values of new 
bond offerings made such offerings an unattractive proposition. The 
regulations have recently been greatly relaxed, but in 1980 indirect finance 
was overwhelmingly more significant than direct finance. (Two often mentioned 
exceptions are Toyota and Shiseido, neither of which had any outstanding debt 
in 1980). 
Commentators often allege that the members of the respective Presidents' 
Clubs are predisposed to trade among themselves but the facts are hard to 
discern. A Japan Fair Trade Commission survey of the trading patterns among 
Presidents' Club members in 1981 (Kosei Torihiki Iinkai, 1983, Table 7, p. 24) 
found that 20% of the sales transactions of manufacturing firms in the 
respective clubs in excess of one million yen were to fellow members of the 
same clubs. And 12% of purchase transactions in excess of one million yen by 
these manufacturing firms were from fellow members. Of course transactions may 
have been outside the Presidents' Club but still within the same keiretsu 
defined more broadly to include affiliates and subsidiaries of the respective 
Presidents' Club members. This evidence does indicate that there are 
significant trading ties among Presidents' Club members, but is not really 
conclusive one way or the other on the issue of exclusivity of the trading 
ties. 
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II. Theories of the Keiretsu 
Analysts of the keiretsu follow one of two tacks. Either they view the 
keiretsu as the creations of the city banks, having fundamentally to do with 
problems of transacting in the credit markets. Or else they view the keiretsu 
as affiliations of transacting firms that include banks but which have to do 
with problems of transacting generally, not just in the credit markets. 
Taking the first view are the growing body of theoretical and empirical 
studies of Japanese corporate finance and the "main bank relationship". In 
this view, the shareholding interlocks among nonfinancial keiretsu firms are 
incidental only, of lesser significance than the ties to financial firms. 
The literature on the main bank system often identifies the keiretsu links even 
among nonfinancial firms as being orchestrated by the banks and essentially 
related to the banks' role as efficent risk bearers and providers of capital. 
Nakatani (1984) argued that the keiretsu main banks insure client firms against 
business risks by adjusting interest rates on loans to move countercyclically. 
As evidence he demonstrated that keiretsu affiliates have lower but more stable 
profit rates than do non keiretsu firms. However Horiuchi, Packer, and Fukuda 
(1988) find that interest payments to the keiretsu banks do not move 
countercyclically, a challenge to the Nakatani thesis. Horiuchi et al do find 
that the longer a firm has the same main bank the less likely it is to switch 
main banks. Thus besides the main bank being merely the single largest lender 
to a firm, it also appears that the main bank in effect enters a long-term 
contractual relation with the client firm. Other authors have speculated that 
a crucial part of banks' arrangements with clients might be the keiretsu 
shareholding interlocks. In this reasoning city banks hold stock in the 
companies to which they lend both to hedge against actions of the client firms' 
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managers that would transfer wealth from creditors to stockholders, and to gain 
a degree of oversight and control that might be used to forestall such behavior 
altogether (Flath ,1984; Hodder and Tschoegl, 1985). 
Theories of the keiretsu that take the opposite tack and place no 
particular stress on the credit transactions among group members include (1) 
the anti-takeover theory, (2) the externality theory, and (3) the vertical 
integration theory. In the anti- takeover theory it is argued that the 
shareholding interlocks are to make takeovers less likely, either to insulate 
managers from disciplining by shareholders (Odagiri, 1975; Kobayashi, 1980; 
Aoki, 1984), or else to prevent hostile stock raiders from abrogating a firm's 
long-term contracts (Ramseyer, 1982; Aoki, 1987). 
In the externality theory, firms affiliate with one another in order to 
internalize the gains from activities with potential spillover effects. For 
instance if advertising by one firm benefits other firms that have its same 
trademark, then this very fact both induces firms to establish common 
trademarks with other firms and to hold shares in the other firms (Hadley, 
1970). Besides advertising, the activity with spillovers could be research and 
development or the collection and dissemination of information (Goto, 1982). 
In the vertical integration theory, firms that are trading partners 
establish share interlocks to induce one another to set prices or orders for 
production that are in their common interest as opposed to one's selfish 
interest (Caves and Uekusa, 1976; Flath, 1989). 
Neither the anti-takeover theory, externality theory, nor vertical 
integration theories requires shareholding by financial institutions. Yet city 
banks have been the most important nexus for cross-shareholding in the 
keiretsu. These three theories suggest exploration of the interlocks and 
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trading ties among nonfinancial keiretsu firms. I reserve this ambitious 
undertaking for a future study and here focus on the shareholding by financial 
institutions. If shareholding by financial institutions is to resolve agency 
problems then factors that exacerbate such problems, such as greater overall 
leverage, ought to induce greater shareholding by creditor firms in their 
clients. Surprisingly little empirical research along these lines has been 
done. The main object of this essay is to carry out precisely such an 
investigation focusing on members of the President's clubs of the six major 
keiretsu in 1980, a year prior to the recent dramatic changes in government 
regulations pertaining to financial transactions in Japan. 
An important preliminary step is the development of a suitable measure of 
the strength of bilateral shareholding links between each pair of firms. The 
problem here is to reduce to a single statistic the rather complicated indirect 
shareholding interlocks linking each keiretsu member to any other fellow 
member. Such a statistic is proposed and computed and becomes the dependent 
variable in the series of regressions that are the main body of the paper. 
Ill. Measuring Bilateral Shareholding Links When There Is Indirect Shareholding 
In this section I will propose a measure of the silent financial interest 
conferred by a firm's direct and indirect shareholding in another firm. 
Indirect shareholding occurs when a company owns stock in a company that itself 
owns stock in another company. 
Let us adopt the notational convention that vectors and matrices are 
denoted by underlined symbols and that scalars are denoted by non-underlined 
symbols. Suppose that there is a set of n firms among which there exist 
shareholding interlocks represented by the nxn matrix D with typical element 
8.. = fraction of i's shares held by i, where 0<5..<1 if i^i, and 5..=0 if i=i. 
ij ij ij 
The profits of these firms, inclusive of returns from equity interests in other 
keiretsu members, may be denoted by the nxl vector n, and 
where z. is the nxl vector of operating profits of the firms, having typical 
element z.. Write 
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where Y=(I.-D) and X is the identity matrix. 
Now the profit maximizing decisions of each firm will in general be 
affected by the shareholding interlocks that link it with fellow keiretsu 
members that are either trading partners, rivals, or a creditor or client. For 
instance if firms i and j are either trading partners, or rivals, or creditor 
and client, then their optimal decisions as to control variables "x", (e.g. 
product price, output, investment, terms of credit) solve a system that 
includes boCh 
where A. and A. are arbitrary constants and v.., v.., v.., and v.. are elements 
i J ii J J Ji iJ 
of the matrix V. Clearly equations (2) depend upon both direct and indirect 
shareholding links between firms i and j. 
Suitable choice of A. and A. will establish bilateral direct shareholding 
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interlocks between i and j that would by themselves induce the same choices x.* 
and x.* as does the complete matrix of direct and indirect interlocks that link 
J 
the two firms. Specifically, let A., A., t.., and t.. be the solutions to the 
J
 i J i J J i 
matrix equation 
Now T.. is the matrix of bilateral direct shareholding interlocks between 
• w. 
the two firms i and j with equivalent influence on their respective choices of 
control variables x. and x. as the complete matrix of cross-shareholding D. 
From (3) one finds that 
As an illustrative example let us consider the case of three firms linked 
by cross-shareholding. Here 
Thus find 
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If firm 1 holds shares in firm 3 and firm 3 holds shares in firm 2, then firm 
l's direct shareholding in firm 2 is augmented by indirect shareholding. 
Algebraically, if 8-~>0 and 5o«>0, then t-0>5in. 
13 51 iz lz 
IV. Data 
The sample of firms included in the empirical study consists of the member 
firms of the six Presidents' Clubs as of September 1 1981, the seven city banks 
that are not club members and the three long-term credit banks, also not club 
members. The financial firms and their keiretsu affiliations are identified in 
Table 1. The non-financial firms and their keiretsu affiliations are listed in 
Table 2. 
All the empirical variables used in this study are defined in Table 3. 
The bilateral shareholding links t.. and t.. between each financial firm i and 
every nonfinancial firm j were computed from the matrix of shareholding 
interlocks linking all the firms, including for t.. (but not for t..) 
shareholding interlocks between firms having differing keiretsu affiliations, 
in the manner detailed above. 
The shareholding matrix includes observations on shareholding by 
financial firms in all other sample firms and shareholding by each nonfinancial 
firm in other nonfinancial firms belonging to a same Presidents' Club as it, 
all as reported on the most recent annual financial statement as of March 31, 1980 
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The variable B.. represents the fraction of j ' s borrowing that is from 
financial institution i. Here "borrowing" includes both long-term and short-
term loans but does not include discounted notes or other trade credit. 
The means and standard deviations of t... 5... t... 8... and B.. are 
ij* ij» ji' ji' lj 
reported in Table 4 for various subsets of the sample firms. Table 4a 
describes the borrowing within keiretsu by type of financial institution. 
Keiretsu city banks on average held 13.5% of the total debt of each 
nonfinancial member of their same President's Club, and held 5.2% of each one's 
stock. The number of such loans was 138 of a maximum possible 156 (There were 
only 14 instances of a company not borrowing at all from from the city bank of 
its same club). Lending by keiretsu trust banks was smaller in magnitude than 
that by city banks, and lending by life insurance companies smaller still. 
There were only three instances of borrowing from hazard insurance companies so 
the hazard insurance companies were dropped from the sample. 
It is apparent from the table that t,. which measures indirect and direct 
shareholding by i in j is only slightly higher on average than direct 
shareholding 8... In fact the two are highly correlated. For the sample of 
all keiretsu financial firms i and nonfinancial firms j of a same kerietsu as 
the respective i, the OLS regression of t.. on 8.. (with t-statistics 
in parentheses) is: 
t.. - 0.009 + 1.055 8.. + 0.511 same.. 
1J
 (18.2) (278.5) 1J (25.3) 1J R =.958; n=5730 
I will use t.. rather than 8.. in the empirical investigation of the following 
section but results would have been little different if 8.. were instead used. 
ij 
Table 4b describes lending by each different class of financial 
institution to firms not of the same keiretsu affiliation as the lender. There 
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are numerous instances of such lending, but on average these loans tend to be 
much smaller in magnitude than the loans within keiretsu. Table 5 shows the 
total lending in the sample by keiretsu affiliation of lender and borrower, 
both in yen and as a percentage of the total overall borrowing by firms in each 
keiretsu Presidents' Club. For instance Mitsui financial institutions lent 
742-billion yen to fellow members of the Mitsui Presidents' Club and this 
constituted 18.3% of these companies' total borrowings. The sample includes 
61.7% of the Mitsui group's total borrowing. It is likely that the balance not 
accounted for, that is borrowing from lenders that are outside the sample, 
includes mainly borrowing from regional banks. One striking feature of the 
data is that substantially more borrowing is from outside each group than is 
from within it. The keiretsu are not monolithic, autarkic entities, but rather 
are groups of affiliated companies each with many ties to companies affiliated 
with other groups or with no groups. The phenomenon in Japan of lenders 
holding equity shares in clients is not limited to the keiretsu. 
V. Hypothesese 
Let us consider the possible role of shareholding by financial 
institutions in resolving agency problems of lending. These agency problems 
have two aspects: (1) Borrowers (qua agents of the lender) may not be as averse 
to default on debt repayments as the lender would like, and (2) prospective 
borrowers may withhold information that would damage their creditworthiness. 
If the borrower is a corporation, let us presume that its powers of decision 
reside in a manager who is the agent of the shareholders. 
The agency problems of debt cause costly transfers of wealth from 
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debtholders to shareholders. If the manager of a firm overstates its 
creditworthiness it can reduce its interest payments and increase the residual 
which is owned by shareholders. Creditors will distrust the manager's 
representations with the result that even firms which truly are creditworthy 
may have to pay the same high interest rate as those which are not. Some 
credit transactions that would be beneficial will not be undertaken. 
In evaluating real investments, if the manager places a zero expected 
present value on all states which result in default on the debt and thus no 
residual for the shareholders, he may select some investments that in fact 
reduce the value of the firm. Creditors will anticipate this behavior and 
require in advance that the shareholders bear the costs of these distorted 
investment choices by promising higher interest payments. 
If creditors hold shares in the borrower both types of agency problem can 
be reduced. Creditors' holding of shares has two effects. First, as 
shareholders, the creditors may exert some influence over the manager's 
decisions, diverting the manager from actions that reduce their wealth (but 
which increase the wealth of other shareholders). Second, as creditors hold a 
larger fraction of the stock, any given actions of the manager that reduce the 
value of the debt but increase the value of the stock will result in smaller 
transfers of wealth, which would presumably mean that such actions would be 
less likely. 
A firm in which debt and stock are held in equal proportions by all 
security-holders is in effect an all-equity firm. There are no agency problems 
of debt for such a firm but whatever real advantages reside in the issuance of 
debt will also be sacrificed. For instance the advantage may be that by 
issuing debt it is possibile to raise capital from sources that lack facility 
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at monitoring the manager. The cost of shareholding by creditors is that, to a 
degree, it displaces shareholding by those with a superior facility at 
monitoring the manager, displaces shareholding by the manager, and displaces 
shareholding by firms that because of their business dealings have a reason to 
hold shares. 
This sketch has identified in a very informal way some of the benefits and 
costs of shareholding by creditors in their clients. Neither the benefits nor 
costs of such shareholding are totally private; there is a public good aspect 
to shareholding by creditors. Shareholding by any one creditor benefits all 
creditors of the same firm in proportion to the fraction of debt each holds. 
The larger creditors can thus be expected to hold more shares. This suggests 
the following hypothesis: 
HI: The greater the fraction of a firm's borrowing that is from a 
particular financial institution, the greater is the institution's 
shareholding interest in the firm. 
The agency problems of debt vary in severity from company to company. One 
obvious factor is the overall extent of borrowing, that is the degree of 
leverage. Companies that borrow most heavily will tend to have greater 
recourse to practices that resolve the agency problems of borrowing, including 
that described above. This reasoning treats the overall borrowing of a company 
as not affected by arrangements with any one creditor, which can only be 
logically maintained as an approximation. Nevertheless this is a maintained 
assumption of the empirical models I test below. My second hypothesis is: 
H2: Financial institutions will have stronger equity positions in 
firms that have greater overall reliance on borrowing. 
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Further, to the extent a borrower holds stock in the lender its interests are 
aligned with the lenders which also mitigates the agency problems of debt. 
Accordingly 
H3: Financial institutions will have smaller equity positions in 
firms that hold more of the financial institutions' stock. 
Other factors that might exacerbate or mitigate the agency problems of 
borrowing and which vary across firms are a lot harder to measure, but their 
effects can be somewhat controlled for by use of the seemingly unrelated 
regressions technique. 
The statistical models I estimate are of the form: 
where the firms i are financial institutions and firms j are nonfinancial 
companies, and e.. is a random variable with expected value zero. Various 
aggregations over i and assumptions about the covariance matrix of the error 
term are employed in the estimations which are reported in the following 
section. 
I have included the variable same in the regression equation but I 
intend to be a bit cautious in interpreting its coefficient. If the real 
economic effects of keiretsu affiliation are fully identified by the other 
variables then the dummy which indicates membership in a same keiretsu should 
not have statistical significance. Statistical significance of same., means 
only that there is some aspect of shareholding by keiretsu financial 
institutions about which I am still ignorant. 
The hypothesese are : 
HI: 5t../3b.. > 0, H2: 3t../3(debt/equity). > 0, and H3: St../at.. < 0. 
ij ij ij J J ij Ji 
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VI. Results 
Ordinary least squares estimates are reported in Table 6 and in Table 7a, 
and estimates using Zellner's seemingly unrelated regressions technique are 
reported in Table 7b. The mean and standard deviation of (debt/equity), are 
1.599, and 1.784, respectively, for the 147 nonfinancial companies on which 
observations exist. For means and standard deviations of other variables 
please refer to Table 4. 
Estimates for samples pooled by type of financial institution are 
estimated by OLS and reported in Table 6. Only for the pooled samples of firms 
having same keiretsu affiliations was it possible to estimate coefficients for 
t... The coefficient of t.. is only significant for trust banks and there it 
has the wrong sign. The hypothesis H3 is not confirmed: There is no clear 
relation between shareholding by companies in banks and shareholding by banks 
in the companies. 
Estimates for individual financial institutions are reported in Table 7a 
using OLS and Table 7b using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
technique. It is apparent from the OLS estimates of Table 7a that the 
coefficents vary both across financial institutions and across types of 
financial institution. Evenso, the seemingly unrelated regression estimates 
and standard errors differ very little from the ordinary least squares 
estimates for individual institutions. 
Several patterns emerge from the estimates for individual financial 
institutions. First, B.. fraction of a company's borrowing that is from a 
particular financial institution induces greater shareholding by the 
institution: HI is confirmed. This effect is strongest for life insurance 
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companies, but most precisely estimated for city banks. The phenomenon is not 
restricted to financial institutions that are affiliated with keiretsu. 
Greater overall leverage induces slightly stronger shareholding by some of 
the city banks but typically induces slightly less shareholding by trust banks 
and by some life insurance companies. Thus H2 is not totally confirmed. Can 
it be that trust banks are free-riding on the monitoring done by city banks 
which are the biggest lenders? That is if a company's overall leverage is 
great this induces greater shareholding by its main bank, which allows a 
relaxation of shareholding by less important creditors. If this interpretation 
is correct then financial institutions in a same keiretsu Presidents' Club are 
not cooperating closely with one another. 
Affilation with the same keiretsu Presidents' Club induces a degree of 
shareholding by financial institutions that is not explained by the other 
variables. This effect is quite large. Apparently there is some important 
aspect of keiretsu affiliation which the other variables fail to capture. 
VII. Conclusion 
The keiretsu were once an object of interest only to the serious 
Japanophiles and students of comparative economics. This is no longer the 
case. Partly this is the result of Japan's increasingly important role in the 
world economy. But also there is growing recognition that Japanese 
institutions address problems of economic organization that are universal. 
Perhaps even the Japanese institutions themselves are not as unique as once 
thought. Jensen (1989), p.73, has recently observed similarities between the 
behavior of city banks at the centers of the six financial keiretsu and that of 
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America's LBO partnerships. The development of convincing models of the 
keiretsu is more important now than ever before. 
My modest contribution has been to show that banks and insurance companies 
in Japan have indeed been more inclined to hold stock directly and indirectly 
in clients that borrow more intensely from them and that some city banks are 
more inclined to hold stock in companies with greater overall leverage. This 
evidence is consistent with the rationale for such stockholding being to 
resolve agency problems of debt. 
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Appendix. Data Sources. 
The members of the Presidents' Clubs of each of the six major keiretsu 
groups, their shareholding interlocks, their borrowing from each financial 
institution, and total borrowing as reported in each company's most recent 
annual financial statement as of March 31, 1981 were taken from the annual 
publication, toyo keizai, kigyo keiretsu soran (general survey of business 
groupings) 1982 edition. Number of outstanding shares of stock were drawn from 
the NEEDS data tape of Nikkei. Closing stock price, December 30, 1980 was 
taken from the Nippon Keizai Shinbun. Dec. 31, 1980; this times number of 
outstanding shares is the measure of market value of equity that I employed. 
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Table 1. Financial Ins titutions in the Sample and Their Keiretsu Affiliations. 
MITSUI MITSUBISHI SUMITOMO FUY0 SANWA DAI-ICHI KANGYO UNAFFILIATED 

























8313 Bank of 
Tokyo 
8319 Daiwa Bank 
8321 Tokai Bank 
8322 Kyowa Bank 
8323 Taiyo Kobe 
Bank 
' 8330 Saitama 
Bank 








8755 Yasuda Trust 
and Banking 
8407 Toyo Trust 
and Banking 
8405 Nippon Trust 
and Banking 
HAZARD INSURANCE 8752 Taisho 
Marine and 
Fire Ins. 






8755 Yasuda Fire 
and Marine 
Insurance 






LIFE INSURANCE 30931 Mitsui Life 
Insurance 
Company 







31638 Yasuda Life 
Insurance 
Co. 
25479 Daide Life 
Insurance 
Co. 
28550 Japan Life 
Insurance 
Co. 
15510 Fukoku Life 
Insurance 
Co. 




Table 2. Non-Financla 1 Companies in the Sample and Their Keiretsu Affiliations. 
MITSUI MITSUBISHI SUMITOMO FUYO SANWA DAI-ICHI KANCYO 
FORESTRY 1371 Sumitomo 
Forestry* 
MINING 1501 Mitsui 
Mining 
1505 Hokkaido 





























2871 Nippon Reizo 
2284 Itoham Foods 




3403 Toho Rayon 3401 Teijin 3407 Asahi 
Chemical 
Industry 
PAPER AND PULP 3861 Oji Paper 3864 Mitsubishi 1 




3862 Honshu Paper 







































4613 Kansai Paint 
4061 Denki Kagaku 
Kogyo 
4205 Nippon Zeon 






Table 2. Continued. 
MITSUI MITSUBISHI SUMITOMO FUYO SANWA DAI-ICHI KANGYO 
OIL AND COAL PRODUCTS 5004 Mitsubishi 
Oil 
5005 Toa Nenryo 
Kogyo 
5003 Maruzen Oil 5002 Showa Oil 
RUBBER GOODS 5105 Toyo Tire 
and Rubber 
5101 The Yokohama 
Rubber 
GLASS AND CERAMICS 5233 Onoda Cement 5238 Mitsubishi 
Mining and 
Cement 




5231 Nihon Cement 
i 
5235 Osaka Cement 5236 Chichibu 
Cement 














5406 Kobe Steel 
5403 Kawasaki 
Steel 
5562 Japan Metals 
& Chemicals 




















5701 Nippon Light 
Metal 
5715 Furukawa 






6471 Nippon Seiko 








Table 3. Variable Definitions. 
Table 4a. Means and standard deviations, selected variables, for financial 
company i and nonfinancial company j, by type of financial institution, 
(units=%). 
» 
Table 4b. Means and standard deviations, selected variables, for financial 
company i and nonfinancial company j, by type of financial institution, 
(units=%). 
Table 5. Credit transactions between sample firms, by keiretsu affiliation. 
Table 6. OLS parameter estimates for pooled data; Dependent variable = t... 
Table 6. OLS parameter estimates for pooled data; Dependent variable «= t.. 

TabLe 7b. SUR parameter estimates; Dependent variable - t 

